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NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY FOR INJURY RESULTING FROM
ISSUANCE OF POLICY TO BENEFICIARY
HAVING NO INSURABLE INTEREST
Negligence law commands that all persons must conduct themselves
according to an established standard in order to protect others against
unreasonable risk of harm., The usual standard imposed is the
mythical conduct of the reasonably prudent man acting under the
same or similar circumstances.! With few exceptions, 3 injury result-
ing from the failure to comply with this standard imposes liability
on the wrongdoer in order to compensate his victim. The full impact
of this basic law was imposed on three life insurance companies in
the recent case of Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon.4 In this case
the defendant insurers issued policies to Mrs. Earle Dennison on the
life of her infant niece-in-law, Shirley Weldon. Mrs. Dennison named
herself as beneficiary, and subsequently murdered Shirley to collect
on the policies. Her convictions was followed by an action brought by
Shirley's father against the defendants under the Alabama "homi-
cide statute."' The plaintiff's theory was based on ordinary negli-
gence; specifically, he alleged that defendants failed to exercise rea-
sonable care in issuing life insurance policies to a person who did
not have an insurable interest, in the life insured. In affirming a
judgment for plaintiff of $75,000, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that the insurance companies had a duty to exercise reasonable care
not to issue life policies to an applicant-beneficiary having no interest
in the continuation of the life insured.8 The court reasoned that the
purpose of the insurable interest rule in life insurance law was to
protect human life, and that an in-law relationship in and of itself
did not constitute an insurable interest., Therefore, failure of the
1. See Prosser, Torts § 30 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Id. § -31.
3, Id. § 109.
4. 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1957).
Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So. 2d 552 (1954).
C. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 119 (1940).
7. While the meaning of the phrase "insurable interest" will be discussed more
fully in text supported by notes 17-21 infra, for the reader's convenience the
phrase means a legally recognized interest of the applicant-beneficiary in the
preservation of the life insured in spite of the insurance, rather than in its
destruction because of the insurance. Vance, Insurance § 31, at 190 (3d ed. 1951)
(hereinafter cited as Vance).
8. 267 Ala. at 185, 100 So. 2d at 708.
,i. Id. at 182, 100 So. 2d at 704.
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defendants to use reasonable care to ascertain whether an insurable
interest existed imposed liability on them for the death of the insured,
despite Mrs. Dennison's intervening criminal act, because this crim-
inal act was the sole foreseeable risk which gave rise to the defen-
dant's duty to protect the insured. 10
The court in the Weldon case appears to have applied ordinary
negligence rules logically. However, it is the first case known to im-
pose on an insurance company the duty to use reasonable care to
determine that an applicant-beneficiary has an insurable interest in
the insured's life before issuing a policy.1 The rule requiring an
insurable interest to support life insurance policies is well known in
insurance law.12 Since the promulgation of the rule almost two cen-
turies ago, the lack of an insurable interest in the life insured has
worked solely to the detriment of the procurer of the policy." Now,
with the Weldon case as precedent, a policy unsupported by an insur-
able interest may also work to the detriment of the insurer. Because
the application of negligence law in the Weldon case may have such
a pronounced effect in this area of life insurance law, the purpose of
this note is to analyze and evaluate the insurable interest rule and its
rationale in comparison with the rationale and possible future effects
of the Weldon case.
The insurable interest rule, in every state, either by force of statute
or common law, requires that any person who procures for his own
benefit an insurance policy upon the life of another must have an
insurable interest in the life to be insured. 4 Without such an interest
10. Id. at 188, 100 So. 2d at 710, citing Restatement, Torts § 448 (1934). The
only act of negligence in the Weldon case was in issuing the policy unsupported
by an insurable interest and thereby placing the insured in a situation wherein
a recognized hazard, i.e., temptation to commit murder, existed. It would be a
logical contradiction to limit liability for the intervening criminal act of murder
which was the sole hazard created by the defendants' negligence in the first place.
See Restatement, Torts § 281, comment e (Supp. 1948). An intervening criminal
act will limit the liability for negligence when that act is outside of the scope of
the foreseeable hazard or hazards created. See Prosser, Torts § 49, at 274
(1955). For example, the intervening criminal act of robbery limited the liability
of a railway company for the robbery when its only act of negligence was over-
crowding a carriage. Cobb v. Great Western Ry., [1894] A.C. 419.
11. 267 Ala. at 185, 100 So. 2d at 708.
12. See notes 14-15 infra.
13. See notes 29-34 infra and text supported thereby.
14. 1 Cooley, Briefs on the Law of Insurance 330 (2d ed. 1927) (hereinafter
cited as Cooley); 1 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 295, at 769 (1929)
(hereinafter cited as Couch); Vance § 31. However, it appears that in New
Jersey policies without an insurable interest may be enforceable on the theory
that the early common law rule enforcing such policies remains unchanged by
statute or case law. See Foster v. Washington Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 118 N.J.L.
228, 192 Atl. 59 (1937); Fulda, Insurable Interest in Life, New Jersey View, 1
Rutgers L. Rev. 29 (1947).
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the policy is void ab initio and totally unenforceable." There are no
exceptions to this rule. Any flexibility it has lies within the court's
power to determine what particular interests are insurable, since no
precise formula for determining what is an insurable interest is avail-
able.' In general, it has been stated that an insurable interest exists
whenever the relation between the beneficiary and the insured,
whether by blood, marriage or commerce, is such that the beneficiary
has a reasonable expectation of deriving benefit from the continuation
of the insured's life, or of suffering detriment through its termina-
tion. 7 For example, a parent has an insurable interest in the life of
his minor child,18 one has an insurable interest in the life of his
spouse,'! and a person in business has an insurable interest in the life
of his partner.-" On the other hand, it is clear that no one has an
insurable interest in the life of a mere stranger, nor in the life of
one who is only a close personal friend.21
Historically,2 the insurable interest rule originated in England as
a result of public policy against wagering. An insurance policy pro-
cured on the life of another, without an insurable interest, was and
remains today a mere wagering contract. At early common law,
wagering contracts in general were enforced. However, the feeling
grew prevalent that wagering was socially undesirable conduct, be-
cause it encouraged persons to seek unearned livelihood which in turn
bred idleness, vice and social unrest. Wagering upon the duration of
human life was considered to be especially harmful, since it created
situations in which a strong temptation to commit murder existed.
The English Parliament responded to these feelings in 1774, imposing
by statuteL3 the rule that no contract of insurance would be deemed
enforceable unless supported by an insurable interest. The statute
came too late to be considered a part of the common law in most
American states, but our courts have felt no hesitancy in applying the
rule on the sole basis of public policy.24 The American cases have
spoken of both of the reasons which gave rise to the rule, i.e., the hos-
15. 1 Couch § 295, at 769; Vance § 31.
16. Vance § 31, at 189-91.
17. Id. at 190.
18. 1 Cooley 380; 2 Couch § 414; Vance § 31, at 194.
19. 2 Couch §§ 396, 440d; Vance § 31, at 196.
20. 1 Cooley 395; 2 Couch § 415; Vance § 31, at 198.
21. Vance § 31, at 189-90. See also Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
22. See generally Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 381
(1918) for a more comprehensive analysis of the development of the rule.
23. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48 (1774).
24. See, Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248
Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tility toward wagering generally,25 and the fear that wagering on lives
would lead to murder.2 However, text authorities have expressed the
view that the prevention of wagering is the main reason for the rule,
and that it is designed only secondarily to lessen the temptation to
commit murder. 2T
The primary sanction which the courts have employed in curtailing
wagers upon lives has been the penalty contained in the insurable
interest rule itself, i.e., that policies unsupported by an insurable in-
terest are void and unenforceable. 28 This sanction has had a marked
effect upon insurance litigation, for it has been given insurance com-
panies a most decided advantage. This can best be seen by consider-
ing a typical case involving the normal application of the rule. Sup-
pose that upon the death of an insured, the insurance company refuses
to pay on the policy and the procurer-beneficiary brings suit to compel
payment. The defense of lack of insurable interest is raised.2s The
burden of proving that such an interest existed at the policy's in-
25. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561 (1876); Chisholm v. National
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213, 14 Am. Rep. 414 (1873) ; Chamberlain v. Butler,
61 Neb. 730, 86 N.W. 481 (1901).
26. The murder rationale for the rule is emphasized in the following state-
ment of Holmes, J., speaking for the court in Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149,
154-55 (1911):
"A contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured has no interest is
a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister counter interest in having the life
come to an end. And although that counter interest always exists ... the chance
that in some cases it may prove a sufficient motive for crime is greatly enhanced
if the whole world of the unscrupulous are free to bet on what life they choose."
Cases which rely upon both the wager and murder rationale for the rule
usually mention them in that order. See, e.g., Geisler v. Mutual Benefit Health &
Accident Ass'n, 163 Kan. 518, 523, 183 P.2d 853, 856 (1947) where the court
said: "[T]he doctrine holding such contracts void is founded upon considera-
tions of public policy, the principal reasons for its pronouncement being (a)
that they are speculative or wagering in character and (b) that they afford an
incentive to crime.... ." Cf. Helmetag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 52 Am. Rep.
316 (1884); Rumsey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 25 Hawaii 141 (1919).
27. See 1 Couch § 296, at 778; Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law § 34,
at 158 (2d ed. 1957) (hereinafter cited as Patterson). Cf. Cooke, The Law of
Life Insurance §§ 58-59 (1st ed. 1891).
28. See note 15 supra.
29. It is generally held that, to be available, the defense of lack of insurable
interest must be specially pleaded. 1 Cooley 431; Shea v. Massachusetts Benefit
Ass'n, 160 Mass. 289, 35 N.E. 855 (1894); Keeton v. National Union, 178 Mo.
App. 301, 165 S.W. 1107 (1914). However, the plaintiff is given the burden of
proof, and is required to state sufficient facts from which the court can infer, as
a matter of law, that an insurable interest existed. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hunn,
21 Ind. App. 525, 52 N.E. 772 (1899); Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co., 66
Mo. 63, 27 Am. Rep. 321 (1877).
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ception is wholly upon the beneficiary30 There are no presumptions
in his favor, and if the proof fails his action is lost. Neither waiver
nor estoppel3 can be invoked against the insurer, who not only issued
the policy in the first place, but readily accepted all of the premium
payments. The beneficiary's action is thus handicapped, and almost
always totally defeated, 3 because courts will not aid either party in
enforcing a contract which is void as against public policy. For the
same reason, a policy's incontestable clause 3 is of no force or effect,
though it plainly reads that the policy cannot be contested by the
insurer after a stated period of time, and this period has elapsed
when the suit is begun.34 In short, nothing can save this transaction
which in the eyes of the law could not be validly entered into in the
first place.
It thus is apparent that the only sanction imposed by the insurable
interest rule, i.e., unenforceability, is a sanction which operates solely
against the person who procured the policy, and in no way against the
insurance company. This result prevails even though insurance com-
30. 1 Cooley 432-34; 1 Couch § 295, at 769-70; see Southern Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Perry, 144 Ark. 512, 222 S.W. 1067 (1920); Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co.,
135 S.C. 89, 133 S.E. 215 (1926).
31. The courts have generally treated waiver and estoppel by saying that mere
knowledge on the part of the insurer that the beneficiary lacked an insurable
interest when he procured the policy can in no way relieve the beneficiary from
proving such an interest as a condition precedent to recovery on the policy.
Parties cannot, even by solemn agreement, override the public policy which re-
quires the beneficiary to have an insurable interest. Cotton v. Mutual Aid Union,
132 Ark. 458, 201 S.W. 124 (1918); Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Allen, 270 Mich.
272, 259 N.W. 281 (1935); Elmore v. Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 504, 198 S.E. 5
(1938) ; 1 Couch § 295, at 770-71; Vance § 85, at 509.
32. It is the general rule that when the policy is void for lack of insurable
interest, the beneficiary cannot recover even the amount of premiums he has paid
to the insurer. Patterson § 43, at 186. However, this rule has been relaxed in
a few cases in which the beneficiary procured the policy in the honest belief that
he had an insurable interest or in which he was induced by fraudulent statements
of the insurer or his agent to procure the policy and pay premiums thereon.
American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bertram, 163 Ind. 51, 70 N.E. 258 (1904); Wash-
ington v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 175 Tenn. 529, 136 S.W.2d 493 (1940). Cf. Fisher
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160 Mass. 386, 35 N.E. 849 (1894).
33. The "incontestable clause" is now an integral part of almost every out-
standing life insurance contract. It provides that the contract's validity cannot
be contested or disputed by the insurer after a specified time has elapsed since
issuance (usually two years). The theory is that an insurer should have a rea-
sonable opportunity to investigate the procurer's statements made in the applica-
tion, but that after such period, any further right to question the policy's validity
should be barred. But the clause cannot serve to validate a contract which is
void ab initio as against public policy. Vance § 97, at 575-84.
34. Ibid.
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panies are fully conscious of the rule,3 whereas persons who procure
policies in violation of it are obviously in complete ignorance of it.
Undoubtedly, the procurer who has once felt the full impact of the
rule will be effectively deterred from repeating his mistake in the
future. Hence, the rule is an effective sanction to prevent future at-
tempts at wagering by the once-defeated applicant. However, the
sanction is not a deterrent against issuance of policies by insurance
companies to future applicants who are as yet unaware of the rule's
existence.
Since persons who procure policies which violate the insurable
interest rule are obviously ignorant that their policies are unenforce-
able, it follows that the rule can in no way prevent the murder of the
insured in such cases, assuming that the procurer has murder in mind
as a method of hastening his collection on the policy. Yet, the pre-
vention of murder is the second reason for the rule's existenceA It
may be contended that the law imposes other sanctions to cope with
the murder temptation, viz., the severe criminal punishment pre-
scribed for murder, plus the civil law rule that no beneficiary who
murders an insured is allowed to collect the policy's proceeds. 37 How-
ever, these sanctions, like the sanction of unenforceability against
wagering discussed above, come into play only after the policy has
been issued and the insured person has met his death. If the danger
of murder is significant, it follows that an additional safeguard is
needed.
The court in the Weldon case believed that the danger of the in-
sured being murdered was significant when the applicant-beneficiary
had no insurable interest in the life insured. 38 Therefore, the court
35. That insurers are fully conscious of the insurable interest rule is apparent
from the advantageous position they maintain in collection controversies. The
court in the Weldon case intimated that it was aware of the insurers' conscious-
ness of the rule in refuting the defendants' argument that the duty imposed by
the court would place an unreasonable burden on insurers. The court answered
that it was no more unreasonable than the burden placed on the procurers who
are required by the terms of many policies to prove an insurable interest at any
time deemed proper by the insurers. The court recognized that such clauses in
insurance policies were devised to effect a savings to the insurance companies
upon an attempted collection by one having no insurable interest in the life in-
sured. 267 Ala. at 186, 100 So. 2d at 708.
36. See note 27 supra and text supported thereby.
37. This rule operates to bar the recovery by any beneficiary who murders an
insured, whether an insurable interest existed or not. The reason for the rule is
said to be expressed by the maxim that "a man may not profit by his own wrong."
This moral sentiment has led the courts to unanimously deny a murderer the
right to collect and retain the policy's proceeds. Patterson § 35. Any interest
which the beneficiary has under the policy thereafter, he holds upon constructive
trust for the estate of the insured. See Restatement, Restitution § 189 (1937).
38. 267 Ala. at 186, 100 So. 2d at 708.
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imposed a new tort duty and sanction to deter insurers from issuing
such policies. 3 In Alabama, at least, insurers now have the duty to
use reasonable care to determine the existence of an insurable interest
before issuing a policy, and face tort liability for any harm resulting
to the insured from their breach of this duty. The reason for its
decision, the court said, was that the insurable interest rule was pro-
mulgated to protect human life, and it believed the new duty and
sanction would effect this purpose.40 That the rule was promulgated
to protect insurance companies was emphatically denied,4 1 although
such a purpose might be inferred from the usual application of the
rule's sanction against wagering. The court indicated that it was
fully aware of the rule's sanction and its effect in the more prevalent
collection controversies. 42 Therefore, in essence, the court to reach
its decision subordinated the historical reason for the rule, i.e., to
prevent wagering, in favor of what many authorities believe is only
the secondary reason. As a result, many proponents of the insurable
interest rule and its sanction may contend that the Weldon case is an
unreasonable encroachment upon almost two centuries of insurance
law.
However, the rule's proponents should recognize that the court in
the Wel&m case applied well established principles of negligence law
in addition to its consideration of the insurable interest rule.43 Con-
ceivably, an insurer might be held liable for negligence alone in a
situation, not unlike the Weldon case, whether an insurable interest
existed or not. For example, suppose that an insurer, knowing that a
certain husband has dangerous propensities, issues to him a policy
upon the life of his estranged wife. Technically, the husband has an
insurable interest in the life of his wife,44 but should he murder her
to collect on the policy, a jury might well hold the insurer liable for
negligence. This is because all persons have the duty to conduct them-
selves according to an established standard in order to protect others
against unreasonable risk of harm.45 In the hypothetical posed, the
insurer breached the duty owed to the insured by knowingly placing
her in a dangerous situation. The insurer's breach was the proximate
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. The court said: "[T]he defendant seems to be of the opinion that the in-
surable interest rule is to protect insurance companies. We do not agree. The
rule is designed to protect human life. Policies in violation of the insurable in-
terest rule are not dangerous because they are illegal; they are illegal because
they are dangerous." Ibid.
42. See notes 29-34 supra and text supported thereby.
43. See notes 8-10 supra and text supported thereby.
44. See note 19 supra.
45. See note 1 supra.
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cause of the harm, despite the intervening criminal act of the husband
because his act was the sole foreseeable risk from which the insurer
had the duty to protect the insured.4r Thus, the insurer is liable with-
out resorting to the question of insurable interest.
In the hypothetical posed, the insurer would be liable for knowingly
placing the insured in a dangerous situation; in the Weldon case the
insurers were liable for placing the insured in a situation which in-
surance law recognizes to be dangerous. It is highly improbable that
situations similar to the hypothetical posed will frequently occur. The
danger lies more prominently in that area where the procurer has no
recognized legal interest in the continuance of the life insured.47 It
was for this reason that the court in the Weldon case couched the
duty of the insurer in terms of ascertaining the existence of an in-
surable interest prior to issuing policies.41 By this means the court
hoped to discourage a form of undesirable conduct much more repug-
nant to society than wagering per se.49
The proponents of the wagering rationale for the insurable interest
rule, while disagreeing with the result of the Weldon case, may seek
some consolation in the fact that the sanction it imposes may more
effectively combat wagering than does the sanction imposed by the
rule itself. For the rule's sanction merely makes wagers unenforce-
able, whereas the sanction of the Weldon case, besides preventing
murder, should effectively discourage wagering attempts. For notice-
ably, this tort sanction materially differs in two respects from the
sanctions previously employed. First, it is imposed on the insurer, not
the procurer. Secondly, this sanction places the burden of determining
the existence of an insurable interest on the party who is most con-
scious of the rule's requirements, the insurer, and requires the deter-
mination to be made before the issuance of the policy. Because of
these two distinguishing characteristics, and assuming that the cir-
cumstances of the Weldon case will recur with enough frequency to
constitute a substantial economic threat to insurers, insurance com-
panies may well revise their procedure in processing applications to
include a feasible means of determining the existence of the appli-
cant's insurable interest. If no legal interest exists, the insurer will
refuse to issue the policy rather than face possible tort liability. As
a result the number of policies without an insurable interest will be
reduced to a minimum, reducing proportionately the need for the
rule's own sanction, i.e., unenforceability of the policy. There will be
fewer controversies where the procurer, ignorant of the rule's exist-
46. See note 10 supra.
47. 267 Ala. at 189, 100 So. 2d at 711.
48. Id. at 186, 100 So. 2d at 708.
49. Ibid.
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ence, faithfully pays his premiums and vainly attempts to collect on
the policy upon the natural death of the insured. Further, since the
prior determination by the insurer will reduce the number of unen-
forceable policies, the possibility that such policies might motivate
the procurer to murder the insured will be reduced proportionately.
Thus, the sanction imposed by the Weldon case may more effectively
combat the evils which created the need for the insurable interest rule
than the sanctions heretofore imposed.
If the rule in the Weldon case is to be generally adopted, the ques-
tion remains of how the insurer is to discharge this duty to exercise
reasonable care in determining whether a procurer has that type of
interest which the law calls "insurable." Despite the existence of the
insurable interest rule for almost two centuries, the question of what
constitutes an insurable interest in a life remains subject to con-
siderable dispute., The law is not in complete chaos on the subject,
for the courts are substantially agreed that in a number of specific
instances, a person invariably has an insurable interest in the life of
another person by the mere fact of relationship alone. Examples,
which have already been mentioned, are the relationships of husband-
wife and parent-minor child.51 However, difficulty arises out of the
fact that there is no precise formula for ascertaining the existence of
an insurable interest in all cases.5 2 This can best be seen by consider-
ing an area which has been troublesome to courts in the normal col-
lection controversies-the area of blood relationships. No court has
been willing to list those blood relationships which will support
an insurable interest in and of themselves; rather, it is merely said
that there must be a close blood relationship. 53 Does this mean that a
50. 1 Couch § 294, at 763; Vance § 31; Comment, 15 Mo. L. Rev. 65 (1950).
See Geisler v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 163 Kan. 518, 183 P.2d
853 (1947).
51. See notes 18-19 supra.
52. Vance § 31, at 191.
53. A primary source of difficulty in evaluating relationships has been the fact
that a contract of life insurance is not one of indemnity, i.e., the amount of re-
covery is a fixed sum and the beneficiary need not prove just how much the in-
sured's life is worth to him. Ordinarily, a wife's interest in the life of her hus-
band would greatly exceed that of an interest in the life of her brother, but if
a court holds that both relationships are "close" enough to support an insurable
interest, she could insure the lives of both in equal amounts or in whatever
amounts she chooses. See Vance § 28, at 158-59. Professor Cooley has stated
that "it seems to be settled" that, if insurable interest is grounded on consanguin-
ity alone, the parties must be related "as closely as the second degree." 1 Cooley
372. However, he appears to have based this mainly upon dictum taken from
Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass'n, 51 S.C. 103, 114, 28 S.E. 200, 204
(1897), to the effect that "close ties of blood or affinity, as parent, child, brother,
sister, husband, wife" are a surer guaranty against the taking of the insured's
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person always has an insurable interest in the life of his brother or
sister? Some decisions indicate that he does,5 4 while others say he
does not.55 Likewise, the cases are split upon whether a grandparent
has an insurable interest in the life of a grandchild merely because
of the blood relationship. 8 Such cases divide primarily on the issue
of whether or not the beneficiary must show a definite pecuniary
interest in the life insured,57 or whether the natural ties of love and
affection in such relationships are sufficient to take the policies out of
the wagering category.55 Professor Vance believes that in a majority
of states the rule is that a mere relationship, however close, is not
sufficient alone to constitute an insurable interest, although he finds
many dicta, and some decisions, to the contrary.9 It would thus
appear that a prudent insurer, before issuing a policy to a procurer
in a jurisdiction having no clear precedent whether the particular
life than any mere pecuniary interest. 1 Cooley 373. The court in the Crosswell
case obviously intended to mention these relationships only by way of example,
and not as an all-inclusive listing.
54. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561 (1876); Webb v. Imperial Life
Ins. Co., 216 N.C. 10, 3 S.E.2d 428 (1939); Rogers v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 135
S.C. 89, 133 S.E. 215 (1926).
55. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 52 Ga. App. 464, 183 S.E. 640 (1936); Miller
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 81 Ind. App. 618, 144 N.E. 554 (1924) ; Loecher v. Kuechen-
miester, 120 Mo. App. 701, 98 S.W. 92 (1906).
56. Cases holding the grandparent-grandchild relationship is sufficient to sup-
port an insurable interest are Breese v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 App. Div.
152, 55 N.Y.S. 775 (1899); Hilliard, Adm'r v. Sanford, 6 Ohio Sup. & C.P.Dec.
449, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 363 (1897). Contra, Burton v. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 119 Ind. 207, 21 N.E. 746 (1889). See 2 Couch §§ 368a, 414a.
57. Life Ins. Clearing Co. v. O'Neill, 106 Fed. 800 (3d Cir. 1901); Bush v.
Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co., 165 So. 486 (La. 1936).
58. The definition which has been most frequently relied upon by courts in
determining what constitutes an insurable interest is contained in the classic
case of Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881). The court stated that: "It is
not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always
capable of pecuniary estimation; for a parent has an insurable interest in the life
of his child, and a child in the life of his parent, a husband in the life of his
wife, and a wife in the life of her husband.... But in all cases there must be
a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other,
either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from
the continuance of the life of the assured." Id. at 779.
As Professor Patterson has pointed out, this language leaves undecided the
question whether "benefit or advantage" means only an economic benefit or also
includes a purely emotional satisfaction. The case has been cited by one court
to support a holding that an adult son has an insurable interest in his aged
mother's life, Woods v. Woods' Adm'r, 130 Ky. 162, 113 S.W. 79 (1908); and by
another court to prove that an adult son has no insurable interest in his aged
father's life, Life Ins. Clearing Co. v. O'Neill, 106 Fed. 800 (3d Cir. 1901).
Patterson § 40, at 180.
59. Vance § 31, at 191-93.
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relationship involved will support an insurable interest, should require
a showing that the procurer has some definite and reasonable pe-
cuniary interest in the continued life of the insured.
In a number of states, statutes have been enacted upon the subject
of insurable interest in life. However, a considerable proportion of
these are fragmentary. 0 Even those which are more complete are
obviously intended only to declare general common law principles,61
thus leaving courts and litigants upon much the same footing as if
no codification had taken place. No statute attempts to make a com-
prehensive listing of relationships to which insurers could look in
determining whether particular applicants have an insurable interest.
Nor does it appear that any such listing has ever been considered as
a feasible solution to the problem."2
60. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 28, § 2 (1940); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-502 (1947); Del.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 919, 921 (1953); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-901 (1953); Mo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 376.530, 376.550, 377.080 (1949) ; N.J. Rev. Stat. tit. 17, c. 34, §§ 26,
28 (1937), tit. 17, c. 34, § 30 (Supp. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code § 3911.09-.11 (Bald-
win 1958); Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-5 (1953); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 52-514
(1945).
61. Cal. Civ. Code § 10110 (Deering 1949); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 41-201, 41-1520
(Supp. 1957) ; Mont. Rev. Code §§ 40-1002, 1003 (1947) ; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-103
(1943), § 44-704 (Supp. 1957) ; N.D. Rev. Code §§ 26-0204, 26-0209, 26-0302, 26-
0312 (1943); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 512 (Purdon 1954); S.D. Code §§ 31.1502-
.03 (1939). For more comprehensive state statutes see note 62 infra.
62. New York's statute is one of the most comprehensive state statutes. It
states:
"1. Any person of lawful age may on his own initiative procure or effect a
contract of insurance upon his own person for the benefit of any person, firm,
association or corporation, but no person shall procure or cause to be procured,
directly or by assignment or otherwise any contract of insurance upon the person
of another unless the benefits under such contract are payable to the person in-
sured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at the time when
such contract is made, an insurable interest in the person insured. . . . If the
beneficiary, assignee or other payee under any contract made in violation of this
subsection shall receive from the insurer any benefits thereunder accruing upon
the death, disablement or injury of the person insured, the person insured or his
executor or administrator as the case may be, may maintain an action to recover
such benefits from the person so receiving them.
"2. The term, 'insurable interest,' as used in this section, shall mean: (a) In
the case of persons related closely by blood or by law, a substantial interest en-
gendered by love and affection; and (b) in the case of other persons, a lawful
and substantial economic interest in having the life, health or bodily safety of
the person insured continue, as distinguished from an interest which would arise
only by, or would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement or injury, as
the case may be, of the person insured. . . ." N.Y. Ins. Law § 146.
Statutes which are identical, or very similar to the New York law are found
in Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1104 (1956); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.650 (Bald-
win 1955); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613 (1950); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art.
48A, § 167 (1957); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3604 (Supp. 1957); Va. Code
§ 38.1-329 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 48.18.030 (1953). For a detailed review and
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Since there is some diversity of authority among states about what
particular relationships will support an insurable interest, insurers
who are writing life policies in several states cannot safely ignore the
fact that a conflict of laws problem could arise in this area. A full
treatment of the subject is beyond the scope of this note; however, the
following example will serve to illustrate the difficulties. An insurance
company incorporated in New Jersey might issue a policy to an
applicant-beneficiary residing in Georgia, upon the life of a resident
of Florida.63 Suppose that the relationship of the beneficiary to the
insured is not recognized under Georgia law as supporting an insur-
able interest, but that it is so recognized in New Jersey, and further,
that the law of Florida is not decided on the question. Then assume
that the facts of the Weldon case are superimposed upon this situa-
tion, and that the insured's survivor brings a wrongful death action
against the insurer. Major problems arise in deciding which state's
law must govern the case. First, where did the tort occur? In the
state where the murder took place, or in the state under whose law
the validity of the policy would be determined? If the latter, then a
second major problem arises, namely, which state's law should deter-
mine the policy's validity? The principles to which courts look in
deciding conflict of laws cases are sufficiently broad to permit a variety
of results, making it difficult to predict the outcome of any given
case.64 Therefore, an insurer who has relied upon the insurable
interest law of one state in issuing a policy may well find that the law
of another state is actually controlling.
Assuming that the problems thus far indicated are not insurmount-
able, a further question must be posed. In exercising reasonable care
comparison of various statutory provisions, plus a suggested model statute on
the subject of insurable interest (based partly on the New York statute, supra),
see Hollenberg, Is a Uniform Statute on Insurable Interest Desirable?, Proceed-
ings of the Section of Insurance Law, A.B.A. Cincinnati Meeting (1946).
63. These were the basic facts which arose in the early New York case of
Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 516 (1861). Upon the natural
death of the insured, the beneficiary sued to compel payment. In allowing re-
covery, the court said that the legal rights arising under such a contract must
depend on the laws of the place where the contract was to be performed, unless
the parties had specially in view the law of the place where the contract was
made. There was nothing to indicate the parties contracted with special reference
to the law of Georgia. "As no other place was mentioned, payment was of course
to be made in New Jersey, where the principal office of the company was located.
The contract was to be performed there, and hence . . . the validity of the con-
tract ... must depend upon the law of New Jersey." 23 N.Y. at 522. As Pro-
fessor Carnahan indicates, New Jersey had the most liberal doctrine as to in-
surable interest, and the court thus chose the rule most favorable to the benefi-
ciary. Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts § 64 (2d ed.
1958).
64. Carnahan, op. cit. supra note 63, § 15, at 52.
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to determine whether an insurable interest exists, to what extent
should the insurer investigate the representations made by the pro-
curer in the policy application?65 The procurer may represent, either
intentionally or inadvertently, that he bears a much closer relation to
the insured than he actually does. For example, he might represent
that he is the "father" of the insured, when in fact he is only the
step-father or father-in-law. The latter two relationships in and of
themselves are not recognized as supporting an insurable interest in
the majority of states.0 In determining if sufficient facts exist to
support an insurable interest, would the insurer be justified in relying
upon a report obtained from an independent insurance inspection
agency ?6- Significantly, the court in the Weldon case relied upon the
fact that the relationship shown in the applications (aunt and niece
by marriage) did not support an insurable interest in and of itself.68
Therefore, it was necessary to give to the jury the question whether
any additional facts existed which would give rise to an insurable
interest."9 It is submitted that the same procedure will be used in
any future cases arising upon similar facts. If the jury finds that
such facts did not exist, it is rather unlikely that it would then find
the insurer had used reasonable care in determining their existence
before issuance of the policy. Realistically, a jury which is first con-
fronted with the fact that the beneficiary has murdered the insured
to collect on the policy will be very difficult to persuade that an in-
surable interest existed, much less that reasonable care was used in
determining such interest prior to the issuance of the policy which
motivated the murder. In the face of this difficulty, insurers may
well conclude that conducting investigations which are thorough
enough to persuade juries that reasonable care was used will be
financially prohibitive; and therefore, that policies should not be
65. For a survey of the duty of insurers generally to investigate the rep-
resentations of the procurer in the policy application, see Note, Insurance-
Insurer's Duty-Investigation for Suspected Fraud Prior to Issuance of Life
Policy, 10 Ark. L. Rev. 499 (1956).
66. National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Ball, 157 Miss. 163, 127 So. 268
(1930) ; Young v. Hipple, 273 Pa. 439, 117 Atl. 185 (1922) ; 1 Cooley 387; Vance
§ 31, at 192-93.
67. Insurance companies today customarily rely upon reports purchased from
commercial investigation agencies, as a means of gathering unbiased information
in regard to policy applications. The usual inspection report contains informa-
tion, based on community and neighborhood reputation, about the applicant's
identity, health, habits, finances and character traits. It is considered to be an
invaluable source of underwr-iting data, since inspection agencies have no interest
either in procuring or in preventing the issuance of the policy. Mehr & Osler,
Modern Life Insurance 459 (rev. ed. 1956).
68. 267 Ala. at 182, 100 So. 2d at 704.
69. Ibid.
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issued in the future to many persons 70 who seek to procure them upon
the lives of others.
Another problem confronting insurers is what action to take con-
cerning policies already issued and now in force, which were procured
by beneficiaries possibly having either no interest or a doubtful one.
An insurer might also consider it financially prohibitive to conduct
an exhaustive investigation of all such outstanding policies, especially
where the purpose of the investigation is to cancel or retract policies
upon which regular premiums are being paid. In deciding upon what
course of action to take, insurers must weigh the expense against the
possible liability which they now face in future negligence actions
brought against them under the precedent established by the Weldon
case. This possible future liability is, of course, an "unknown factor"
incapable of reduction to a monetary estimate, but certainly it merits
consideration in view of the size of the judgment recovered in the
Weldon case. The Weldon case was a wrongful death action in which,
under Alabama law, the jury was not limited in fixing the amount of
recovery.71 Even though some states do put an upper limit upon re-
covery in such cases,7 2 the insurer should bear in mind that such limit
would not apply if its negligence resulted in a serious injury to the
insured, instead of death. In other words, the insured might be the
victim of an unsuccessful attempt by the beneficiary to use murder
as a means of collecting on the policy. In such case the insured him-
self would bring the action against the insurer, and the jury would be
free to fix whatever amount necessary to fully compensate the insured.
Clearly, the problems indicated above are substantial hindrances to
insurance companies in their efforts to avoid future liability under
the WeZdon case. Because of these problems, some courts may con-
sider that the case imposes an unreasonable burden upon insurers,
and hence either should not be followed, or else should be confined
within narrow and well-defined limits of liability. Other courts may
feel that the burden placed on insurers is outweighed by the higher
aim of protecting society as a whole against the evils inherent in the
practice of issuing life insurance policies to persons having no legal
interest in the continued lives of insured persons. Whichever view is
70. An insurer might well decide to restrict the issuance of policies to those
cases where the applicant first proves that he bears the exact relationship to the
beneficiary that he has stated in the application, provided that such a relationship
has been clearly recognized by case law or statute in the jurisdiction as con-
stituting an insurable interest.
71. The so-called Alabama "homicide statute" allows the plaintiff to recover
"such damages as the jury may assess" without placing a limit on the amount.
Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 119 (1940).
72. McCormick, Damages § 104 (1935).
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chosen, a careful analysis of all important factors should precede any
final determination in future cases.
In summary, this note has attempted to point out factors both for
and against the new sanction imposed by the Weldon case. It has
been shown that the sanction of negligence liability imposed upon
insurers who issue policies in violation of the insurable interest rule
will probably serve the actual purposes behind the rule more efficiently
than have any sanctions heretofore imposed. The sanction is accom-
panied, however, by serious problems. Chief among these is the
problem of defining "insurable interest." Another is the serious
conflict of laws problem which may arise when the insurer is issuing
policies to residents of a number of different states. Finally, insurers
may find that the conducting of investigations thorough enough to
convince a jury that reasonable care has been used to determine the
existence of an insurable interest will be too costly, and hence they
will either disregard the Weldon case or will refuse to issue policies
to many persons who are entitled to insurance protection. If it be
believed that these problems place an unreasonable burden upon in-
surers, then it is submitted that courts could very well limit liability
to cases in which the insurers, at the time of issuing policies, con-
sciously adverted to the unmistakable lack of an insurable interest in
the life insured, or in which insurers adverted to enough facts to put
a reasonable person on notice that an insurable interest was absent.73
7.3. While the problem is beyond the scope of this note, it is submitted that the
reasoning of the Weldon case might be applied to hold an assignor of an en-
forceable policy liable for assigning it to one having no insurable interest in the
life insured. Presently, the majority rule upholds such assignments. Vance § 33.
Might not such an assignment create a temptation to commit murder to hasten
the collection of the policy's proceeds?
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